Spatial Price Discrimination with Heterogeneous Firms by Jonathan Vogel
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES








I am grateful to Esteban Rossi-Hansberg and especially to Gene Grossman and Faruk Gul for helpful
comments. I have also benefited from a stimulating discussion by Thomas Chaney at the CEPR Conference
on Product Heterogeneity and Quality Heterogeneity in International Trade. An earlier draft of this
paper appeared in my dissertation. I acknowledge with thanks the National Science Foundation for
support under grants SES 0211748 and SES 0451712. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or
recommendations expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the National Science Foundation, or of any other organization, or of the National Bureau
of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2009 by Jonathan Vogel. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to
the source.Spatial Price Discrimination with Heterogeneous Firms
Jonathan Vogel
NBER Working Paper No. 14978
May 2009, Revised February 2011
JEL No. L13
ABSTRACT
In this paper we present and solve a three-stage game of entry, location, and pricing in a spatial price
discrimination framework with arbitrarily many heterogeneous firms. We provide a unique characterization




420 West 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
and NBER
jvogel@columbia.edu1 Introduction
In this paper we present and solve a three-stage game of entry, location, and pricing in a spa-
tial price discrimination framework with arbitrarily many heterogeneous ￿rms. We provide
a unique outcome of all pure undominated strategy SPNE without imposing restrictions on
the distribution of marginal costs or the allocation of transportation costs between ￿rms and
consumers.
We answer the following question: What determines the pattern of ￿rm entry, location,
market share, and pro￿t in an environment in which heterogeneous ￿rms have the ability
to spatially price discriminate? In the context of the present paper, spatial price discrim-
ination represents the ability of a ￿rm to charge di⁄erent prices to consumers at di⁄erent
locations in space, but does not imply a restriction that consumers cannot arbitrage away
price di⁄erences.
Spatial price discrimination is possible in markets in which ￿rms are geographically di⁄er-
entiated, such as ready-mixed concrete. In such a market, a producer observes the location
of each of its customers and can condition its customer-speci￿c price on this location. While
customers can arbitrage away price di⁄erences across space, they￿ like the producer itself￿
must incur a transportation cost to deliver the good. Spatial price discrimination is also
possible in markets in which producers sell goods tailored to the desired speci￿cations of
their customers, such as di⁄erentiated intermediate input producers. In such a market, a
producer customizes its output to match the requirements of each of its customers and can
condition its price on these requirements. While customers can arbitrage away price di⁄er-
ences, they￿ like the producer itself￿ must incur a customization cost to tailor the good.
More generally, spatial price discrimination may occur in many markets in which buyers and
sellers bargain over the joint surplus of trade, and in which surplus depends on a measure of
distance between each potential buyer-seller pair.1
The present paper makes contributions along three dimensions. First, it reproduces recent
results￿ in Vogel (2008)￿ that were obtained in a framework that applies to very di⁄erent
types of industries than the present paper. In particular, spatial price discrimination was
not allowed in Vogel (2008). Second, it generalizes these predictions in several important
respects: (i) It does not impose restrictions on the distribution of marginal costs across ￿rms;
(ii) It does not impose a restriction on the allocation of shipping costs between ￿rms and
their customers; and (iii) It includes an entry stage in which, in equilibrium, less productive
1In the present paper we assume that all bargaining power is allocated to buyers.Spatial price discrimination with heterogeneous firms 2
￿rms do not enter. Finally, by greatly simplifying the game￿ precisely by allowing for spatial
price discrimination￿ the present paper highlights in a clearer way the economic intuition
behind these recent results.
Section 2 introduces our theoretical framework. The market is represented by the unit cir-
cumference, which is populated with uniformly distributed consumers. There is a potentially
large set of potential entrants with di⁄erent constant marginal costs of production. These
￿rms play a three-stage game of complete information. In the ￿rst stage, potential entrants
simultaneously choose whether to enter and incur a ￿xed cost or to exit. In the second stage,
the entrants simultaneously choose their locations in the market. In the ￿nal stage, ￿rms
simultaneously set their prices, where each ￿rm can price discriminate, potentially choosing
a di⁄erent price for each location in the market.
In Sections 3-5 we solve for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium using backward induc-
tion. The central testable implication of this paper, contained in Section 5, is similar to that
in Vogel (2008): in equilibrium, more productive ￿rms are more isolated￿ all else equal￿ ,
supply more consumers, and earn more pro￿t. While the key result is similar, the interpre-
tation of this result di⁄ers: in the present model, this result implies that more productive
￿rms customize their products to a broader class of customers. Moreover, the speci￿cs of
the present model enable a cleaner link between theory and data along at least three dimen-
sions. For example, (i) four-digit SIC industries reviewed in Bartelsman and Doms (2000)
have 85th￿15th total factor productivity ratios in the range of 2 : 1 to 4 : 1. Nevertheless, the
new spatial competition models that incorporate ￿rm heterogeneity all impose a restriction
on the extent of permissible asymmetry between ￿rms; see e.g. Aghion and Schankerman
(2004), Syverson (2004), Alderighi and Piga (2008), and Vogel (2008). The present paper
requires no such restriction. Moreover, (ii) shipping costs are substantial in a wide range of
industries. Whether a supplier or a consumer incurs the cost of transportation is typically
an equilibrium outcome rather than an industry-wide restriction. Nevertheless, in most spa-
tial competition frameworks, it is assumed that either suppliers, or more often consumers
incur the full cost of transportation; see e.g. Hotelling (1929), Lancaster (1979), and Salop
(1979). The present paper requires no such arbitrary assumption. Finally, (iii) selection on
productivity appears to be an important characteristic within a wide range of industries, see
e.g. Syverson (2004). The present paper is the ￿rst to solve for both the set of heterogeneous
￿rms that enter a given market and their locations within that market.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the assumption of spatial price discrimination is
key to the present paper￿ s ability to relax restrictions￿ on the distribution of marginal costsSpatial price discrimination with heterogeneous firms 3
across ￿rms and on the allocation of shipping costs between ￿rms and their customers￿ that
must be imposed in Vogel (2008). Spatial price discrimination greatly simpli￿es the game.
As is well known, under the assumption of mill pricing￿ in which a ￿rm charges a single
price regardless of customer location￿ solving for an equilibrium to a location-and-pricing
game is complicated because of issues that arise in the price stage; see e.g. d￿ Aspremont,
Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979). The model with spatial price discrimination is signi￿cantly
more tractable: in the ￿nal stage, in which ￿rms choose prices, ￿rms engage in Bertrand
competition with undi⁄erentiated goods at each location.
This is not the ￿rst paper to consider price discrimination in a spatial competition model;
see e.g. Hoover (1937), Lederer and Hurter (1986), Hamilton, Thisse, and Weskamp (1989),
Hamilton, MacLeod, and Thisse (1991), and MacLeod, Norman, and Thisse (1992).2 Build-
ing on these papers, the primary focus of which was existence of equilibria, we emphasize
the determinants of isolation for arbitrarily many heterogeneous ￿rms. This paper also con-
tributes to a growing spatial competition literature concerned with heterogeneous ￿rms; see
e.g. Aghion and Schankerman (2004), Syverson (2004), Alderighi and Piga (2008), and Vo-
gel (2008). Unlike Aghion and Schankerman (2004), Syverson (2004), and Alderighi and
Piga (2008), the present paper considers not only endogenous prices, but also endogenous
locations.
2 Setup
Firms: There is a set N containing jNj ￿ 2 potential entrants each of which is endowed
with a unique marginal cost of production ci 2 [0;v￿t=2).3 Firms play a three-stage game of
complete information. In the ￿rst age, the entry stage, ￿rms simultaneously choose whether
or not to enter and incur a ￿xed cost f > 0. Those ￿rms that do enter move to the second
stage, the location stage, in which ￿rms simultaneously choose their locations in the market,
where the market is represented by the unit circumference the points of which are indexed
in a clockwise direction by z 2 [0;1]. In the third stage, the price stage, ￿rms simultaneously
choose price schedules. Each ￿rm i can price discriminate, choosing a price pi (z) for each
2Spatial discrimination in the Cournot setting with homogeneous ￿rms has also been studied; see e.g.
Anderson and Neven (1991) and Chapter 9 of Combes, Mayer, and Thisse (2008). Bernard, Eaton, Jensen,
and Kortum (2003) consider a spatial price discrimination model of international trade.
3The assumption of an upper bound on ￿rm costs is to insure that at least one ￿rm enters the market.
The assumption that no two ￿rms have the same marginal cost of production is for exposition only. Both
assumptions could be dispensed with easily.Spatial price discrimination with heterogeneous firms 4
location z on the circle. A ￿rm i that is located at point ￿i and sells to a consumer at
point z incurs a delivered marginal cost of ki (￿i;z) ￿ ci + tk￿i ￿ zk, where k￿i ￿ zk is the
shortest arc-length separating the ￿rm from the consumer, and t 2 (0;2v) is the cost of
transportation.
Consumers: The market is populated by a unit mass of consumers who are uniformly
distributed along the circumference of the circle. Each consumer is strategic and consumes
one unit of a homogeneous good￿ buying from the lowest price source￿ if and only if the
lowest price at which she can purchase the good, inclusive of transportation costs, is no
greater than her reservation value, v > 0. With strategic consumers, there is a ￿nal, un-
modeled stage, the consumer choice stage, in which consumers make their purchases.4
Although all results hold whether the ￿rm, the consumer, or any combination thereof
incurs the cost of shipping, for consistency we assume throughout that ￿rms bear the cost
of transportation. Nevertheless, consumers are not restricted from taking advantage of ar-
bitrage opportunities. If one consumer ships a good a distance d to another consumer, then
the consumers incur a cost of transportation equal to td.
Equilibrium concept and equilibrium outcome: Throughout the paper we focus on
pure strategy subgame perfect Nash Equilibria that are the limits of equilibria in weakly
undominated strategies of approximation games with discrete price grids.5 We refer to these
simply as equilibria.
We de￿ne an equilibrium outcome as a vector fK;x;￿g, where K ￿ N is the set of ￿rms
that enter the market, x 2 R
K is the vector of market shares of the entrants such that if
jKj ￿ 1 then
P
i2K xi = 1 and xi ￿ 0 for all i 2 K, and ￿ 2 R
K is the vector of variable
pro￿ts of the entrants. We say that there is a unique equilibrium outcome if the set of ￿rms
that enter and each ￿rm￿ s market share and pro￿t are the same across all equilibria.
In the following sections we use backward induction to provide the unique equilibrium
outcome in the limiting case in which the ￿xed cost of entry converges to zero, f ! 0. The
assumption of an arbitrarily small ￿xed cost is important for obtaining a uniqueness result in
the present setup.6 However, we could obtain a uniqueness result without this assumption,
4We discuss the rationale for assuming strategic consumers below.
5Although standard in games of Bertrand competition with undi⁄erentiated goods, we discuss the ratio-
nale for this equilibrium concept below.
6If entry costs are su¢ ciently large, then there may exist multiple equilibrium sets of entrants. This
is a generic issue in oligopoly models with heterogeneous ￿rms (e.g. Cournot). However, given the set of
entrants, the equilibrium outcome is unique for an arbitrary ￿xed cost.Spatial price discrimination with heterogeneous firms 5
if we assumed instead sequential entry of ￿rms (and a discretely positive ￿xed cost of entry)
in the entry stage.
3 Price stage
Fix the integer number of ￿rms in the market at n ￿ 1, the vector of marginal costs of ￿rms
in the market at c, and the location of all such ￿rms ￿. If n = 1, the monopoly charges
each location the maximum price, v, at which consumers are willing to purchase the good.
In what follows, suppose that n ￿ 2.
With Bertrand competition, heterogeneous ￿rms, and a continuum of prices there are
two standard technical issues. For simplicity, suppose that there are two ￿rms, 1 and 2
with c1 < c2, and one location. The ￿rst technicality is that there is no pure strategy
equilibrium in a game in which consumers are not strategic and the tie-breaking rule places
positive probability on both ￿rms. To demonstrate this issues, ￿x any p2 2 (c1;c2]. For
any p1 < p2, ￿rm 1 has an incentive to increase its price; and for any p1 ￿ p2, ￿rm 1 has
an incentive to decrease its price. To avoid this technicality we assume that consumers are
strategic. With strategic consumers, the only subgame perfect equilibria that exist satisfy:
(i) p1 = p2 2 [c1;c2] and (ii) consumers buy from ￿rm 1. For this reason we assume
that consumers are strategic.7 The second technicality is that there exists a continuum
of equilibria in which ￿rm 2 sets any price p2 2 [c1;c2] and ￿rm 1 charges p1 = p2, and
because we assume that the price space is continuos, there is no equilibrium in weakly
undominated strategies; that is, eliminating weakly dominated strategies in the game with
a continuous price space would rule out the classical Bertrand outcome of p1 = p2 = c2.
We rule out equilibrium prices p2 < c2 because they are not limits of equilibria in weakly
undominated strategies of approximation games with discrete price grids; see, e.g., Deneckere
and Kovenock (1996) and page 260 of Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995).
With strategic consumers and Bertrand competition at each location z, the unique equi-











7Alternatively, we could assume an exogenous tie-breaking rule in which consumers always buy from the
low cost ￿rm when faced with equal prices.Spatial price discrimination with heterogeneous firms 6
The ￿rm with the lowest delivered marginal cost sells the good to consumers at point z at
a price equal to the second lowest delivered marginal cost. At these prices consumers have
no incentive to arbitrage: the upper bound on the price di⁄erence charged to two consumers
separated by a distance of d is td, and this upper bound equals the cost that the consumers
would have to incur to transport the good from one to the other.
Constructing market shares and pro￿ts: In what follows in this section we construct
market shares and pro￿ts in the special case in which all ￿rms supply a positive mass of
consumers. Denote by boundary consumer any consumer at the boundary between the sets
of consumers supplied by two ￿rms. Suppose that no two ￿rms are located at the same point
and that ￿rm i only sells to consumers located between its two closest neighbors, ￿rms i￿1
and i+1, where ￿rm i￿1 is the closest neighbor in the counterclockwise direction and ￿rm
i + 1 is the closest neighbor in the clockwise direction. If all ￿rms supply a positive mass
of consumers, then the boundary consumer between i and i + 1 is a customer for whom the
delivered costs of i and i + 1 are lower than the delivered costs of any other ￿rms.
Let di;i+1 and di￿1;i denote the distance between ￿rm i and ￿rm i+1 and between ￿rm i￿1
and ￿rm i in the clockwise direction, respectively. Let xi;i+1 and xi;i￿1 denote the distance
from ￿rm i in the clockwise direction of the boundary consumer between ￿rm i and ￿rm
i+1 and in the counterclockwise direction of the boundary consumer between ￿rm i and ￿rm
i￿1, respectively. Firm i+1￿ s delivered marginal cost of supplying the boundary consumer
between i and i + 1 is ci+1 + t(di;i+1 ￿ xi;i+1), which equals ￿rm i￿ s delivered marginal cost








[ci￿1 ￿ ci + tdi￿1;i]. (2)




[ci+1 + ci￿1 ￿ 2ci + tDi]
where Di ￿ di￿1;i + di;i+1 denotes ￿rm i￿ s isolation, the distance between its two neighbors.
Normalize ￿rm i￿1￿ s location as point zero and de￿ne all other points by their distance
from i ￿ 1 in the clockwise direction. Firm i￿ s price at point z is determined by ￿rm i ￿ 1￿ s
delivered cost if ci￿1 +tz ￿ ci+1 +t(Di ￿ z). Firm i￿ s price at point z is determined by ￿rmSpatial price discrimination with heterogeneous firms 7











Firm i￿ s price at a given z is
pi (z) =
(
ci￿1 + tz if z < z￿
ci+1 + t(Di ￿ z) if z > z￿
Similarly, express the locations of the boundary consumers in terms of their distance from
￿rm i ￿ 1 as Xi;i￿1￿ which denotes the distance in the clockwise direction from ￿rm i ￿ 1
of the boundary consumer between ￿rm i and ￿rm i ￿ 1￿ and Xi;i+1￿ which denotes the
distance in the clockwise direction from ￿rm i ￿ 1 of the boundary consumer between ￿rm

















(ci+1 ￿ ci) (4)
Similarly, express ￿rm i￿ s delivered marginal cost in terms of the distance, z, from ￿rm i￿1
as ki (z), where
ki (z) = ci + tkdi￿1;i ￿ zk
Firm i￿ s variable pro￿t, ￿i, can be separated into two terms, the pro￿t it earns over the
range in which its price is determined by ￿rm i + 1, and the pro￿t it earns over the range












[ci+1 + t(Di ￿ z) ￿ ki (z)]dz.











Figure 1 depicts the delivered marginal cost for ￿rm Y , the price that ￿rm Y charges each
of its customers, and ￿rm Y ￿ s market share. Firm Y ￿ s pro￿t is then the area under ￿rm Y ￿ sSpatial price discrimination with heterogeneous firms 8








Figure 1: Firm Y ￿ s market share and pro￿t given
locations
4 Location stage
In this Section, we obtain three results. First, we solve for the unique equilibrium outcome
in the special case in which all ￿rms that entered are "su¢ ciently productive," where this is
de￿ned below. In this case we show that every ￿rm￿ s market share and variable pro￿t are
strictly positive. Second, we show that if at least one ￿rm that entered is not su¢ ciently
productive, then there exists no equilibrium in which all entrants have strictly positive market
shares or variable pro￿ts. The ￿rst and second results￿ together with the fact that each ￿rm
incurs a positive ￿xed cost of entry￿ suggest an important entry stage result: in the entry
stage, only su¢ ciently productive ￿rms choose to enter. Hence, the unique equilibrium
outcome in the special case in which all ￿rms are su¢ ciently productive is the relevant case
in any equilibrium. Third, we show by construction that an equilibrium exists to an arbitrary
location-stage subgame.
Let K0 ￿ N denote the set of ￿rms in the market. If jK0j = 1, then the monopoly ￿rm is
indi⁄erent between all locations. In what follows, suppose that jK0j ￿ 2. To crystallize ideas,
we ￿rst consider a special case of the model in which each ￿rm in the market is su¢ ciently










where c(K0) ￿ 1
jK0j
P
n2K0 cn is the average marginal cost of ￿rms in the market. As shownSpatial price discrimination with heterogeneous firms 9
below, in any equilibrium ￿(K0) serves as an inverse measure of the toughness of competition
in the market. Competition is tougher in a market with more (active) ￿rms, holding ￿xed the
average marginal cost (of active ￿rms). Similarly, competition is tougher in a market with
a lower average marginal cost (of active ￿rms), holding ￿xed the number of (active) ￿rms.
The following Lemma provides a su¢ cient condition under which each ￿rm in the market
is productive enough to supply a positive mass of consumers. Under this condition, the
following Lemma (i) states that an equilibrium exists and (ii) provides the unique equilibrium
outcome.8
Lemma 1 Consider a location-stage subgame in which the set of the ￿rms in the market is





There exists an equilibrium to the location-stage subgame. In any such equilibrium, the
distance between any two neighbors i and i + 1 is given by








and, for all i 2 K, ￿rm i￿ s market share and variable pro￿t are given by









The key property of any equilibrium characterized in Lemma 1 is that each ￿rm is centered
in its market share; that is, each ￿rm is equidistant from its boundary consumers in the
clockwise and counter-clockwise directions. Because the cost of supplying consumers is
increasing in distance (and the revenue from supplying consumers is decreasing in distance),
each ￿rm locates at the center of the mass of consumers it supplies. Figure 2 depicts ￿rm
Y ￿ s market share, total cost, and total revenue given a non-equilibrium location for ￿rm Y ,
8All Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.Spatial price discrimination with heterogeneous firms 10
between ￿rms X and Z.
X Y Z
Figure 2: Out of equilibrium location
In Figure 2, ￿rm Y is closer to its boundary consumer on the side it shares with ￿rm X
than it is to the boundary consumer on the side it shares with ￿rm Z. If ￿rm Y were to
move towards ￿rm Z, ￿rm Y ￿ s market share would remain constant, its total revenue would
increase, and its total costs would decrease. Hence, in equilibrium Y must be centered in its
market share, as depicted in Figure 3.
X Y Z
Figure 3: Equilibrium location
This property of any equilibrium, that each ￿rm is centered in its market share, yields
two related results. First, ￿rm i￿ s equilibrium market share and pro￿t depend on ￿rm j 6= i￿ s
marginal cost only through j￿ s impact on ￿. Second, each ￿rm￿ s market share and pro￿t is
constant across all equilibria; see Equations (9) and (10).
Unique equilibrium market shares and pro￿ts: According to Lemma 1, if each n 2 K
satis￿es Condition (7) then a ￿rm￿ s market share and pro￿t are identical in all equilibria and
depend on another producer￿ s marginal cost only through its impact on the average marginal
cost, c(K).
Because each ￿rm is centered in its market share, the delivered marginal cost of supplyingSpatial price discrimination with heterogeneous firms 11
all boundary consumers must be equal to t
2￿(K), which directly implies that ￿rm i￿ s market
share and pro￿t depend on its competitors￿marginal costs only through their impact on
￿(K). This implies that there is a unique equilibrium outcome.
This result and its economic intuition are similar to those in Proposition 1 of Vogel (2008).
Nevertheless, a unique equilibrium outcome arises in Vogel (2008) only after imposing a
restriction that ￿rms incur a positive shipping cost that they cannot pass along to consumers.
Without this assumption in Vogel (2008), a ￿rm￿ s cost of supplying a set of consumers is
independent of its location (with mill pricing, revenue per sale is always ￿xed). Here, no
such assumption is needed. Intuitively, with price discrimination, the identity of the party
that pays the cost of transportation is inconsequential. The ￿rm can always pass along this
cost to the consumer; but in equilibrium it will not, since its price at each location is pinned
down by the costs of its competitors.
Permissible asymmetries: Lemma 1 provides an explicit bound￿ in Condition (7)￿ on
the extent of marginal cost asymmetry under which there exists an equilibrium in which
all ￿rms supply a positive mass of consumers. According to Equation (9), if ￿rm i violates
Condition (7) and all ￿rms follow their equilibrium strategies, then ￿rm i￿ s market share
is zero. To understand the intuition behind Condition (7), suppose that all ￿rms locate
as prescribed by Lemma 1 and denote by g (z) ￿ minj2K fkj (z)g the minimum delivered
marginal cost, taken over all ￿rms, to a consumer located at point z. As depicted in Figure
4, we have g (z) ￿ t
2￿(K) for all z, since t
2￿(K) is the minimum delivered marginal cost
at each boundary consumer and boundary consumers face the highest minimum delivered





Figure 4: Boundary consumers face the same minimum delivered marginal cost
If ￿rm i violates Condition (7), then its revenue per sale is bounded above by its marginal
cost and it is unable to earn positive variable pro￿t. Of course, if all ￿rms have symmetricSpatial price discrimination with heterogeneous firms 12
marginal costs equal to c, then all ￿rms satisfy Condition (7) for any jKj.
Although this explicit bound on the extent of permissible marginal cost asymmetry rep-
resents an improvement with respect to Vogel (2008), in which no such explicit bound is
derived, a goal of this paper is to provide a unique equilibrium outcome for an arbitrary
distribution of marginal costs. It then remains to consider the case in which at least one
￿rm violates Condition (7). The following Lemma takes a ￿rst step in this direction.
Lemma 2 Consider a location-stage subgame in which the set of the ￿rms in the market is
K, with jKj ￿ 2. If at least one ￿rm n 2 K violates Condition (7), then there exists no
equilibrium in which all ￿rms have strictly positive market shares.
The intuition for Lemma 2 is straightforward. Suppose that at least one ￿rm n 2 K
violates Condition (7) and￿ contrary to Lemma 2￿ that there exists an equilibrium in which
all ￿rms have strictly positive market shares. In such an equilibrium, each ￿rm must be
centered in its market share, as discussed above. If each ￿rm is centered in its market share
and all ￿rms sell to a positive mass of consumers, then each ￿rm￿ s market share must be
given by Equation (9). However, if any ￿rm n violates Condition (7), then Equation (9)
predicts that ￿rm n￿ s market share is not positive, a contradiction that proves the lemma.
According to Lemma 2, if there is su¢ cient heterogeneity in unit costs, then at least one
￿rm earns no variable pro￿t. Looking forward, Lemma 2 ensures that if the ￿xed cost of
entry is positive and if an equilibrium exists, then all ￿rms that enter in the ￿rst stage must
satisfy Condition (7) relative to the set of entrants. If any ￿rm enters that does not satisfy
this condition, then at least one ￿rm￿ s total pro￿t is negative, which cannot happen along
the equilibrium path. Since, if an equilibrium exists, all entrants must satisfy Condition (7),
then on the equilibrium path the location-stage equilibrium is as prescribed in Lemma 1.
It remains to provide an existence result for a location-stage subgame in which at least
one ￿rm violates Condition (7) relative to the set of entrants. This is carried out in the
following lemma.
Lemma 3 There exists an equilibrium to an arbitrary location-stage subgame.
>From Lemma 1 we know that an equilibrium exists in the special case in which all ￿rms
satisfy Condition (7) relative to the full set of entrants. To gain intuition in the general
case, consider a location-stage subgame in which the non-empty set of ￿rms in the market
is K0 ￿ N . The ￿rst step of the proof is to show that for any such set K0, there exists aSpatial price discrimination with heterogeneous firms 13
unique subset K￿ (K0), de￿ned by K￿ (K0) ￿
￿
i 2 K0jci < t
2￿[K￿ (K0)]
￿
, that satis￿es two
properties. First, if only ￿rms in K￿ (K0) were in the market, then all ￿rms in K￿ (K0) would
satisfy Condition (7) relative to K￿ (K0). That is, in any equilibrium in which the set of
entrants is K￿ (K0), each ￿rm would have a positive market share. Second, there exists no
￿rm i in K0 but not in K￿ (K0) that would satisfy Condition (7) relative to K￿ (K0)[i. That
is, in any equilibrium in which the set of entrants were K￿ (K0)[i, for any i 2 K0nK￿ (K0), at
least one ￿rm would not have a strictly positive market share. Finally, note that this subset
K￿ (K0) contains all the ￿rms in K0 with a marginal cost below a certain cuto⁄, where this
cuto⁄ depends on the set K0.
Given the existence of this unique and non-empty set, the intuition for the proof is
constructive. If jK￿ (K0)j ￿ 2, we construct an equilibrium in which equilibrium locations
of all ￿rms in K￿ (K0) are those that are prescribed by Lemma 1 if only ￿rms in K￿ (K0)
were in the market. In constructing the locations of the ￿rms K￿ (K0), it is as if the ￿rms in
K0nK￿ (K0) had not entered the market. The remaining ￿rms in K0 that are not in K￿ (K0),
if any, are all located at the same point as a boundary consumer. At these locations, the
delivered marginal cost at any location z of any ￿rm i 2 K0nK￿ (K0) is weakly greater than
is the delivered marginal cost at that location of at least two ￿rms in K￿ (K0). Hence, no
￿rm i 2 K0nK￿ (K0) a⁄ects the price charged at any point in the market. That is, given
these locations, it is as if the ￿rms in K0nK￿ (K0) had not entered the market. Hence, no
￿rm in K￿ (K0) has an incentive to deviate. Moreover, given the locations of the ￿rms in
K￿ (K0), no ￿rm in K0nK￿ (K0) is su¢ ciently productive to earn positive variable pro￿ts
from any location. Hence, no ￿rm in K0nK￿ (K0) has an incentive to deviate. Thus, we have
constructed an equilibrium if jK￿ (K0)j ￿ 2. Using similar logic we show that if jK￿ (K0)j = 1,
then there exists an equilibrium in which all ￿rms locate together and ￿rm i 2 K￿ (K0)
supplies the entire market.
According to Lemma 3, an equilibrium exists in any location-stage subgame. Neverthe-
less, Lemma 3 does not state that there is a unique equilibrium outcome in an arbitrary
subgame. To obtain a unique equilibrium outcome, we will include an entry stage with a
positive, but vanishingly small ￿xed cost in the following section.
5 Entry stage
In the entry stage, each ￿rm i 2 N chooses whether or not to enter. If a ￿rm chooses to enter,
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enter if and only if it anticipates earning non-negative pro￿t. Recall the discussion following
Lemma 2: if the ￿xed cost of entry is positive and if an equilibrium exists, then all ￿rms
that enter in the ￿rst stage must satisfy Condition (7) relative to the set of entrants. The
role of the ￿xed cost is to ensure that if the set of entrants is K, then all ￿rms in K satisfy
Condition (7) relative to K. Hence, if an equilibrium exists in which at least two ￿rms enter,
then given the set of entrants, the unique equilibrium outcome is as prescribed by Lemma 1.
However, we still do not know which ￿rms enter and whether the set of entrants is
unique. In order to ensure that there is a unique set of entrants in equilibrium, in the
following proposition we assume that the ￿xed cost of entry is su¢ ciently small. With a
su¢ ciently small ￿xed cost, and using Lemmas 1-3, we obtain the central result of the paper
in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 There exists a ￿xed cost f￿ > 0 such that for all f < f￿:
1. an equilibrium exists;
2. the equilibrium outcome is unique; and
3. if jK￿ (N)j > 1, then ￿rm i￿ s market share and variable pro￿t are given by Equations (9)
and (10) in which K ￿ K￿ (N); and if jK￿ (N)j = 1 then ￿rm i 2 K￿ (N) sets price v at all
locations and xi = 1.
Intuition: According to Proposition 1, if the ￿xed cost of entry is su¢ ciently low, then the
unique set of entrants is K￿ (N) and there is a unique equilibrium outcome. Given the set
of entrants, the unique equilibrium outcome is not surprising. But why is there a unique set
of entrants? To understand this result, it is instructive to consider two potential equilibria
(A and B) in an environment in which there are three potential entrants, N = f1;2;3g,
with c1 < c2 < c3 and with K￿ (N) = f1;2g. Potential equilibria A and B di⁄er in terms of
the ￿rms that enter along the proposed equilibria paths: along the equilibrium path in both
potential equilibria, given the entrants the equilibrium in the location-stage subgame is as
prescribed by Lemma 1.
In potential equilibrium A, ￿rms 1 and 2 enter while ￿rm 3 does not enter. In this
potential equilibrium, suppose that ￿rm 2￿ s pro￿ts are strictly positive while ￿rm 3￿ s pro￿ts
would be strictly negative if it entered. In potential equilibrium B, ￿rms 1 and 3 enter while
￿rm 2 does not enter. In this potential equilibrium, can it be the case that ￿rm 3￿ s pro￿ts
are strictly positive while ￿rm 2￿ s pro￿ts would be strictly negative if it entered? For a
su¢ ciently large ￿xed cost, the answer to the previous question can be "yes" (not only in
the present model, but also in a basic model of Cournot competition). If the costs of ￿rms 2Spatial price discrimination with heterogeneous firms 15
and 3 are su¢ ciently similar, then this is intuitive. Hence, for a su¢ ciently large ￿xed cost,
the set of entrants is not necessarily unique.9
However, now consider the case in which the ￿xed cost of entry is su¢ ciently close to
zero. In this case, potential equilibrium A is an equilibrium. For a su¢ ciently small ￿xed
cost of entry, ￿rm 2￿ s pro￿ts are positive (and therefore so are ￿rm 1￿ s) if only ￿rms 1 and
2 enter. To see that ￿rm 3 would have no incentive to deviate and enter, suppose that ￿rms
1, 2, and 3 all enter. Because ￿rm 3 violates Condition (7) relative to the set of entrants N,
there is no equilibrium in which all ￿rms have a strictly positive market share. Moreover,
￿rm 3￿ s market share must equal zero if it enters: if its market share were positive, then one
of the more productive ￿rms (e.g. ￿rm 2) must have a market share of zero. But if ￿rm
2￿ s market share were zero, then it could deviate in the location stage by locating at the
same point as ￿rm 3; by doing so, ￿rm 2 would obtain a positive market share and positive
variable pro￿ts while ￿rm 3 would have zero market share and zero variable pro￿t. Hence,
￿rm 3 would have no incentive to enter, so that potential equilibrium A is an equilibrium.
On the other hand, for a su¢ ciently small ￿xed cost of entry, potential equilibrium B (in
which only ￿rms 1 and 3 enter) is not an equilibrium because ￿rm 2 would have an incentive
to enter. If ￿rm 2 does not enter, its pro￿t is zero. However, in any equilibrium in which ￿rm
2 does not have a positive market share (whether or not it enters), at least one boundary
consumer faces a price p ￿ t
2￿[K￿ (N)], which is strictly above ￿rm 2￿ s marginal cost. Hence,
if ￿rm 2 were to enter, it could locate at the same point as one such boundary consumer
and obtain a strictly positive market share (and variable pro￿t). For a su¢ ciently small
￿xed cost of entry, ￿rm 2 would earn strictly positive pro￿ts by entering, so that potential
equilibrium B is not an equilibrium.
According to Proposition 1, an equilibrium exists in which at least one ￿rm enters, the
same set of ￿rms enter in all equilibria, and each ￿rm￿ s market share and pro￿t are the
same across all equilibria. Moreover, this result holds for any distribution of marginal costs
satisfying ci 2 [0;v ￿ t=2), where the restriction that ci < v ￿ t=2 ensures that almost all
consumers are supplied in all equilibria.
9Even in this case, market shares and pro￿ts are uniquely determined by Lemma 1, given the entrants.Spatial price discrimination with heterogeneous firms 16
6 Discussion
The result in the literature most closely related to Proposition 1 is Proposition 1 in Vogel
(2008). As in Vogel (2008), in this paper there is a unique equilibrium outcome according
to which more productive ￿rms are more isolated￿ all else equal￿ , supply more consumers,
and earn a higher pro￿t. Unlike Vogel (2008), we obtain these results (i) for an arbitrary
distribution of marginal costs, (ii) without imposing a restriction that ￿rms incur a positive
shipping cost that they cannot pass along to consumers, and (iii) while including an entry
stage in which less productive ￿rms do not enter. As discussed in the Introduction, each
of these generalizations is potentially important for linking the theory to the data. In this
section we focus on the impact of the cost of transportation, the ￿xed cost, market toughness,
and a ￿rm￿ s marginal cost on its isolation, market share, and pro￿t.
Isolation: The distance between two neighbors, ￿rm i and ￿rm i + 1, is greater than the
average distance between ￿rms, 1=jKj, if and only if their average marginal cost is less than
the average marginal cost of all active ￿rms in the market. Moreover, holding the average
marginal cost of active ￿rms constant, the distance between neighbors is a strictly decreasing
function of their average marginal cost. Intuitively, high-cost active ￿rms shy away from the
harsh competition of low-cost ￿rms.
Neighbors are more isolated if there are fewer active ￿rms in the market or if the average
marginal cost of active ￿rms in the market is greater. The impact of the number of active
￿rms on isolation is straightforward and deserves no special mention since it is obtained
in models with symmetric ￿rms; see e.g. Salop (1979), Economides (1989), and Lancaster
(1979). The impact of the average marginal cost of active ￿rms on isolation is only obtained
elsewhere, to the best of our knowledge, in Vogel (2008). If ￿rm j￿ s marginal cost increases
and the number of ￿rms in the market remains constant, then ￿rm j must become less
isolated. This requires that the distance between ￿rms i and i+1 increases, for any j 6= i;i+1.
The impact of the transportation cost, t, on isolation is more complex in the current
model than in Vogel (2008). As in Vogel (2008), for a ￿xed set of active ￿rms, a decrease
in t increases the bene￿t of a lower marginal cost in terms of isolation because consumers
are relatively more sensitive to di⁄erences in marginal costs than di⁄erences in distances.
In addition, in the current model a reduction in t also restricts entry, because pro￿ts are
increasing in t for ￿xed locations. This provides an additional bene￿t of a lower marginal
cost in terms of isolation. The ￿xed cost only a⁄ects isolation by restricting entry because
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Market share and pro￿t: More productive ￿rms have larger market shares and earn
higher pro￿ts. In particular, a ￿rm￿ s market share and pro￿t are greater than average if
and only if its marginal cost is less than average, and a ￿rm￿ s market share and pro￿t are
decreasing in its marginal cost. The reason more productive ￿rms supply a larger mass of
consumers derives entirely from the fact that these ￿rms are more isolated, as all ￿rms charge
the same average FOB price of ￿t=2. In particular, ￿rm i charges a minimum FOB price
of t
2 [￿(K) ￿ xi (K)], which equals ci, to its boundary consumers and charges a maximum
FOB price of t
2 [￿(K) + xi (K)] to those consumers jointly located with the ￿rm.
In the present paper, more productive ￿rms earn higher pro￿ts both because (i) they
supply a larger mass of consumers and (ii) they charge higher absolute markups, on aver-
age. In the model, ￿rm i￿ s average absolute (FOB) markup is ￿t=2￿ci, which is decreasing
in its marginal cost. Intuitively, productive ￿rms set higher average absolute markups be-
cause their greater isolation provides increased monopoly power. In fact, all ￿rms charge
identical absolute (FOB) markups to consumers located z units away from their boundary
customers. However, a more productive ￿rm supplies customers located farther from its
boundary customer.
The number of active ￿rms and their average productivity a⁄ect a ￿rm￿ s market share
and pro￿t in the expected directions. A reduction in the cost of transportation reduces a low
productivity ￿rm￿ s pro￿t and market share and has an ambiguous e⁄ect on a high produc-
tivity ￿rm￿ s pro￿t and market share. The direct e⁄ect of a reduction in t reduces each ￿rm￿ s
pro￿t. However, as noted above, reducing t both restricts entry￿ which increases isolation
for all remaining active ￿rms￿ and increases the relative return to higher productivity. An
increase in the ￿xed cost f reduces the pro￿t of a low productivity ￿rm and has an ambigu-
ous e⁄ect on a high productivity ￿rm. The direct e⁄ect of an increase in f is to lower each
active ￿rm￿ s pro￿t. However, increasing f restricts entry, which increases variable pro￿t for
all ￿rms that remain active. Clearly the direct e⁄ect wins out for the high cost ￿rms that
exit.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we presented and solved a three-stage game of entry, location, and pricing
in a spatial price discrimination framework with arbitrarily many heterogeneous ￿rms. In
contrast to the spatial competition literature of which we are aware, we did not impose re-
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costs between ￿rms and consumers. Our main empirical prediction is that more productive
￿rms are more isolated, all else equal.
Our analysis is limited in (at least) three important respects. We have assumed that
consumers are uniformly distributed through space, that space is one dimensional, and that
the game is static. These are strong and unrealistic assumptions that we made for tractability.
Nonetheless, we hope that the paper provides useful insight into the determinants of ￿rm
isolation.Spatial price discrimination with heterogeneous firms 19
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof proceeds in 3 Steps.
Step 1: Consider a location-stage subgame in which the set of ￿rms in the market is K, with
jKj ￿ 2. If there exists an equilibrium to this subgame in which all ￿rms supply a positive mass of
consumers, then the distance between any two neighbors i and i + 1 is given by Equation (8) and
￿rm i￿ s market share and variable pro￿t are given by Equations (9) and (10).
Proof: Suppose there exists an equilibrium to the subgame beginning in the location stage in
which all ￿rms supply a positive mass of consumers. Fix the location of all ￿rms and consider the
e⁄ect of ￿rm i￿ s unilateral "-deviation towards ￿rm i+1 (if " > 0) or towards ￿rm i￿1 (if " < 0).
From Equations (3), (4), and (5), ￿rm i￿ s ￿rst-order condition for a maximum￿ conditional on all
￿rms supplying a positive mass of consumers￿ is given by
di;i+1 (K) = di￿1;i (K) +
1
t
(ci￿1 ￿ ci+1). (11)
Such a location locally maximizes ￿rm i￿ s pro￿ts as the second-order condition is satis￿ed. If an
equilibrium exists in which all ￿rms supply a positive mass of consumers, then given an order of
￿rms around the circle (i) each ￿rm￿ s location must satisfy Equation (11) and (ii) the sum of
distances between all pairs of ￿rms must sum to 1, i.e.
dn;1 (K) + ￿n￿1
i=1 di;i+1 (K) = 1. (12)
Solving Equation (11) recursively yields
di+j;i+j+1 (K) = di￿1;i (K) +
1
t
(ci￿1 + ci ￿ ci+j ￿ ci+j+1).
The distance between two arbitrary neighbors as a function of the distance between ￿rms 1 and n,
where ￿rm 1 is ￿rm n￿ s clockwise neighbor, is
dj;j+1 (K) = dn;1 (K) +
1
t
(cn + c1 ￿ cj ￿ cj+1). (13)
Substituting Equation (13) into Equation (12) provides the solution for the distance between ￿rm
1 and ￿rm n








Substituting the solution for dn;1 (K) into Equation (13) yields Equation (8). Given Equation (8),
it is straightforward to show that market shares and variable pro￿ts are given by Equations (9)
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Step 2: In any location-stage subgame in which all n 2 K satisfy Condition (7), each i 2 K
supplies a positive mass of consumers in any equilibrium.
Proof: To obtain a contradiction, suppose that there is an equilibrium to this subgame in which
a ￿rm i 2 K does not supply a positive mass of consumers. The entire market must be supplied
by at most the remaining jKj ￿ 1 ￿rms. Moreover, cj < t













so that cj < t
2￿(K) , cj < t
2￿(Knj). Hence, the distance between at least one ￿rm j 2 K,
j 6= i and at least one of its boundary consumers is strictly greater than 1
2xj (K), given in Equation
(9). Thus, the delivered marginal cost to this boundary consumer is strictly greater than t
2￿(K).
Because ci satis￿es Condition (7), ￿rm i could locate at the point at which this boundary consumer
is located and supply a positive mass of consumers while earning a strictly positive variable pro￿t,
a contradiction.
Step 3: There exists an equilibrium to any location-stage subgame in which each n 2 K satis￿es
Condition (7).
Proof: Suppose that all ￿rms n 2 Kni locate as prescribed by Lemma 1. Let gi (z) ￿ minj6=i kj (z)
denote the minimum delivered marginal cost, taken over all ￿rms but ￿rm i, to a consumer located
at point z. Then gi (z) is continuous and
R
z2# g (z)dz denotes ￿rm i￿ s revenue from selling to a set
# of consumers. Let #￿
i denote the set of consumers to whom ￿rm i sells if ￿rm i does not deviate
from the location prescribed by Lemma 1. The lowest cost location from which to supply all z 2 #￿
i
is the location prescribed by Lemma 1. Step 3 then follows directly from the fact that g (z) > g (z0)
for almost all z 2 #￿
i and z0 = 2 #￿
i.
Lemma 1 follows directly from Steps 1-3. QED.
Proof of Lemma 2. To obtain a contradiction, suppose (i) that the set of the ￿rms in the market
is K, with jKj ￿ 2; (ii) that at least one ￿rm n 2 K violates Condition (7);and (iii) that there
exists an equilibrium in which all ￿rms have strictly positive market shares. According to Step
1 in the proof of Lemma 1, in any such equilibrium each ￿rm i￿ s market share must be given by
￿(K) ￿ 2
tci. Because ￿rm n violates Condition (7), we have 2
tcn ￿ ￿(K). Hence, ￿rm n￿ s market
share is bounded above by zero, a contradiction. QED.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose that the non-empty set of entrants is K0. The proof requires four
steps.
Step 1: If i 2 K￿ (K0) and cj < ci, then j 2 K￿ (K0).
Proof: To obtain a contradiction, suppose that i 2 K￿ (K0), cj < ci, and j = 2 K￿ (K0). IfSpatial price discrimination with heterogeneous firms 21
j = 2 K￿ (K0), then cj ￿ t
2￿[K￿ (K0) [ j], which is equivalent to cj ￿ t
2￿[K￿ (K0)]. However,
i 2 K￿ (K0) implies ci < t
2￿[K￿ (K0)]. Hence, cj > ci, a contradiction.
Step 2: There exists a unique non-empty K￿ (K0) ￿
￿




Proof: To obtain a contradiction, suppose that there exists a K1 ￿
￿






i 2 K0jci < t
2￿(K2)
￿
with K1 6= K2. According to Step 2, we have either K1 ￿ K2 or
K2 ￿ K1. Suppose that K1 ￿ K2. We have
￿(K2nV ) ￿ ￿(K2) > ￿(K1) for any V ￿ K2nK1 (14)
The ￿rst inequality in Equation (14) follows from cj < t
2￿(K) , cj < t
2￿(Knj). The second
inequality in Equation (14) follows from the fact that K1 ￿ K2 requires the existence of at least
one ￿rm j such that cj 2 [￿(K1);￿(K2)), which implies ￿(K1) < ￿(K2). Because Equation
(14) holds for any V ￿ K2nK1, it must hold for V = K2nK1. However, when V = K2nK1
Equation (14) requires ￿(K1) > ￿(K1), a contradiction. Hence, there exists a unique K￿ (K0) ￿
￿
i 2 K0jci < t
2￿[K￿ (K0)]
￿
. Moreover, K￿ (K0) is non-empty as t
2￿(i) ￿ t
2 +ci > ci for any ￿rm i.
Step 3: Consider the case in which jK￿ (K0)j ￿ 2. First consider an arbitrary j 2 K0nK￿ (K0).
Given the locations of all ￿rms i 2 K￿ (K0), the maximum delivered marginal cost, taken over all
i 2 K￿ (K0), at any point in the market is t
2￿[K￿ (K0)] ￿ cj. Hence, ￿rm j has no incentive to
deviate as it cannot earn positive variable pro￿ts from any location. Second, consider an arbitrary
￿rm i 2 K￿ (K0). Given the locations of all j 2 K0nK￿ (K0) and the fact that cj ￿ t
2￿[K￿ (K0)],
each ￿rm j 2 K0nK￿ (K0) does not impact the potential variable pro￿ts of ￿rm i at any location
that ￿rm i chooses. Then according to Lemma 1, ￿rm i has no incentive to deviate. This concludes
the proof of Lemma 3 in the case in which jK￿ (K0)j ￿ 2.
Step 4: Consider the case in which jK￿ (K0)j = 1. No ￿rm j 2 K0nK￿ (K0) can make positive
variable pro￿ts locating anywhere in the market, so these ￿rms have no incentive to deviate. Given
that all ￿rms j 2 K0nK￿ (K0) locate together, ￿rm i 2 K￿ (K0) earns the same variable pro￿t no
matter where it chooses to locate, so it too has no incentive to unilaterally deviate. This concludes
the proof of Lemma 3 in the case in which jK￿ (K0)j = 1.
Combining Steps 3 and 4 directly yields the desired result. QED.
Proof of Proposition 1. We ￿rst prove Part 1 of the proposition, that an equilibrium exists.
Let f0 ￿ minj2K￿(N) ￿j [K￿ (N)], where f0 > 0 follows from Lemma 1 and the de￿nition of K￿ (N).
Suppose that 0 < f ￿ f0 and consider a potential equilibrium in which the set of entrants is
K￿ (N) and the equilibrium to the subgame beginning in the location stage is as prescribed by
Lemma 1. If ￿rms follow the strategies prescribed by this potential equilibrium, then no ￿rm
i 2 K￿ (N) has an incentive to deviate in the location or price stages, according to Lemma 1.
Moreover, ￿i [K￿ (N)] ￿ f0 for all i 2 K￿ (N). Hence, no ￿rm i 2 K￿ (N) has an incentive toSpatial price discrimination with heterogeneous firms 22
deviate in any stage for any f < f0. Now suppose that the set of entrants is K￿ (N) [ j for some
j 2 NnK￿ (N). In this case, an equilibrium exists to the location-stage subgame, according to
Lemma 3, and at least one ￿rm has a market share of zero, according to Lemma 2. To obtain
a contradiction, suppose that ￿rm j￿ s market share is positive. If j￿ s market share were positive,
then one of the more productive ￿rms (e.g. ￿rm i) must have a market share of zero. But if ￿rm
i￿ s market share were zero in equilibrium, then it could deviate in the location stage by locating
at the same point as ￿rm j; by doing so, ￿rm i would obtain a positive market share and positive
variable pro￿ts, a contradiction. Thus, ￿rm j￿ s market share must equal zero and its pro￿t must be
negative if deviates from the strategy prescribed by the potential equilibrium. Hence, the potential
equilibrium is an actual equilibrium if 0 < f < f0, concluding the proof of Part 1.
We now prove Part 2 of the proposition. To obtain a contradiction, suppose that the set of
entrants is K0 6= K￿ (N). There are three cases to consider: (i) K0 ￿ K￿ (N), (ii) K￿ (N) ￿ K0,
and (iii) there exist i 2 K￿ (N) \ (NnK0) and j 2 (NnK￿ (N)) \ K0.10 First, consider case (i):
K0 ￿ K￿ (N). Note that ￿rm i satis￿es Condition (7) relative to K if and only if ￿rm i satis￿es



















Using Condition (15), we can show that if K0 ￿ K￿ (N), then there exists at least one ￿rm i 2
K￿ (N)nK0 that could enter and earn strictly positive variable pro￿t. Therefore, if f is su¢ ciently
close to zero, then this ￿rm i would have an incentive to deviate and enter, a contradiction. Hence,
for f > 0 su¢ ciently close to zero, case (i) cannot be an equilibrium. Second, consider case
(ii): K￿ (N) ￿ K0. Using the same argument as in the proof of Part 1 of the proposition, there
is at least one ￿rm i 2 K0nK￿ (N) that has a market share of zero and a negative pro￿t, a
contradiction. Hence, case (ii) cannot be an equilibrium. Finally, consider case (iii): there exist
i 2 K￿ (N) \ (NnK0) and j 2 fNnK￿ (N)g \ K0. To obtain a contradiction, suppose that ￿rm
i 2 K￿ (N) \ (NnK0) enters but does not obtain a strictly positive market share in the resulting
subgame equilibrium. In this case, each boundary consumer must face a price p < t
2￿[K￿ (N)];
otherwise ￿rm i could locate on a boundary consumer facing a price p ￿ t
2￿[K￿ (N)] and would
obtain a strictly positive market share. If each boundary consumer faces a price p < t
2￿[K￿ (N)],
then no ￿rm j 2 fNnK￿ (N)g \ K0 can obtain a strictly positive market share. This implies that
the market is being served by the set of ￿rms K￿ (N)\K0. By the same argument in case (i), ￿rm
i can choose a location at which it serves a strictly positive market share, a contradiction. Hence,
for f > 0 su¢ ciently close to zero, case (iii) cannot be an equilibrium, concluding the proof of Part
2.
10Note that case (iii)￿ the most complex case￿ is the case discussed following Proposition 1 in the text.Spatial price discrimination with heterogeneous firms 23
Finally, Part 3 follows directly from Parts 1 and 2. According to Part 2, for an f > 0 su¢ ciently
close to zero, there exists no equilibrium in which the set of entrants is K0 6= K￿ (N). According to
Part 1, for an f > 0 su¢ ciently close to zero, there exists an equilibrium in which the set of entrants
is K￿ (N). Given that the set of entrants is K￿ (N) in any equilibrium with f > 0 su¢ ciently close
to zero, in any such equilibrium market shares and variable pro￿ts are as in Equations (9) and (10).
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